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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute that authorizes the Department of Justice to civilly commit 
federal prisoners after their release if they suffer from a mental illness 
or abnormality that causes “serious difficulty in refraining from sexual-
ly violent conduct.”1  Not only has the federal government authorized 
civil commitment for sexually violent predators, but as of 2009, twenty 
states have also enacted statutes authorizing the same.2  By 2006, more 
than 3646 people had been detained or committed under these laws.3  
Such commitments generally occur in secure mental health facilities, 
some of which are connected to, or within, prisons.4  A person com-
mitted under a sexually violent predator law is committed until he5 no 
 
1 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4247(a)(6) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The statute was upheld un-
der the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Id. at 1965. 
2 Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs:  Current Practices, Character-
istics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439, 441 (2009). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 444.  Of the states authorizing commitment, only Texas employs outpatient 
treatment and supervision in lieu of inpatient commitment.  Id. 
5 Sex offenders may, of course, be male, female, or self-identify outside of traditional 
gender norms.  However, for the sake of convenience, and because the overwhelming 
majority of sex offenders are male, I use male pronouns throughout this Comment.  
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longer presents a danger to the community.6  This often results in 
commitment for life;7 the New York Times reported that, as of 2007, only 
250 civilly committed sex offenders had been released from confine-
ment.8  Often unsympathetic characters in the courtroom, sex offenders 
face an uphill battle in proving that they should be set free despite 
their past offenses.  
Statutes providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators typically require that the State prove at least three elements 
before commitment can be effected:  (1) the defendant must have 
been convicted of, or at least have been charged with, a sexually vio-
lent offense; (2) the defendant must have a mental disorder or ab-
normality, generally defined as “a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the 
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting 
such person a menace to the health and safety of others”;9 and (3) 
there must be a prediction of future dangerousness—a likelihood that 
the defendant will continue to engage in sexually violent behavior.10  In 
the landmark decision Kansas v. Crane, the Supreme Court held that, in 
 
6 See 51 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS § 13 (Supp. 2008) (“The SVP [sexually violent 
predator] laws provide that a person can be released if it can be shown that his mental 
disorder has changed to the extent that it is safe to release him, as he will no longer 
engage in sexually violent acts.”). 
7 See Mary Prescott, Note, Invasion of the Body Snatchers:  Civil Commitment After Adam 
Walsh, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 854 (2010) (noting that very few civilly committed sex 
offenders ever receive a full discharge). 
8 See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1 (“Nationwide, of the 250 offenders released un-
conditionally since the first law was passed in 1990, about half of them were let go on 
legal or technical grounds unrelated to treatment.”). 
9 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (Supp. 2008).  Many commentators have noted 
that the statutory definition of a mental illness or abnormality is all encompassing and 
does not limit itself to what clinicians or even the general populace would naturally 
consider as falling under these categories.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, 
Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 260-61 (1998) (stating that the  
statutory definition of mental illness describes a person as abnormal “if any biological 
or environmental variable caused the person’s emotional or volitional capacity to predis-
pose the agent to engage in criminal sexual misconduct” and concluding that this defini-
tion is “simply a description of the causation of any behavior”); see also LOLA ROMANUCCI-
ROSS & LAURENCE TANCREDI, WHEN LAW AND MEDICINE MEET:  A CULTURAL VIEW 44 -45 
(2007) (“This definition incorporates the causation of every conceivable behav-
ior . . . [and] nothing about the definition . . . narrows the class of persons that can be 
designated as ‘abnormal.’  The definition is entirely predicated on the presence of ‘crim-
inal sexual acts’ and becomes a tautology, i.e. ‘mental abnormality’ equals ‘criminal sexu-
al acts’ and vice versa, an equation that provides justification for commitment.”). 
10 51 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 6, § 8.  
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addition to these statutory elements, “there must be proof of serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior” before the state may, consistent with 
due process, subject the defendant to civil commitment.11   
While the application of Crane’s holding—that there must be proof 
that the offender lacks control—is problematic on account of its am-
biguity, this Comment argues that there are ways in which courts can 
better apply the standard to ensure that due process is provided to de-
fendants.  Specifically, Crane mandates that states require a separate 
finding on the issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty 
controlling his behavior.12  In light of this mandate, states should at-
tempt to operationalize the evidentiary requirement by developing a 
standard definition—grounded in the norms and judgment of the 
community—on the issue of what constitutes serious difficulty in con-
trolling oneself to assure a more consistent and fair application of the 
concept across cases.13  In addition, state courts should restrict expert 
testimony to a qualitative description of the defendant’s ability to con-
trol himself rather than permitting experts to render ultimate conclu-
sions.  Lastly, juries should be instructed that there is no generally 
accepted method for measuring volitional impairment in the mental 
health community.  These procedures will help ensure that the trier of 
fact understands that “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behav-
ior”14 is a legal standard and can then properly weigh expert testimony. 
It is important to note from the outset that this Comment, in argu-
ing for a more stringent application of the control test to justify civil 
commitment, does not argue that sex offenders should face less re-
strictive or less severe consequences for their actions.  The sex offend-
ers facing civil commitment in these cases have already been found 
guilty of their crimes and have been punished by the criminal justice 
system.  The issue is whether some sex offenders should face civil 
commitment after and in addition to the time they have already served 
for their crimes.  As explained by Professor Stephen Morse, 
 
11 534 U.S. 407, 411-13 (2002).   
12 See id. at 413 (explaining that, in order to justify civil commitment of a sex of-
fender, “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,” such that the 
“dangerous sexual offender” can be distinguished from the “typical recidivist”). 
13 For an example of one scholar’s operational definition of “substantial difficulty 
controlling oneself” as well as commentary on how this definition may be bolstered, see 
infra note 139.  
14 Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.  
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Our society routinely and regretfully releases from prison inmates we know 
are highly likely to re-offend, because culpability limits the term of possible 
confinement.  Their prison term “cleanses” their culpability for past crime, 
and no general form of pure preventative detention exists for responsible 
agents who are simply dangerous, no matter how serious their past record 
nor how predictable their future violence might be.15 
Thus, sex offenders do not face detention simply because society con-
siders them likely to re-offend; offenders face detention only if society 
also deems that they are substantially unable to control their behavior.16  
Because of this distinction, the factfinder’s determination on the issue 
of control is an essential safeguard that limits the number of offenders 
who are eligible for civil commitment.  This Comment is premised on 
the idea that our justice system must clearly define the rules for deter-
mining when a person who has already faced criminal punishment and 
been “cleansed” of his prior crimes should be incapacitated indefinitely 
via civil commitment solely for the future protection of the community.  
Part I discusses the legal background of civil commitment for sex-
ually violent predators, including the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane.  Part II surveys and critiques 
the various ways in which state appellate and supreme courts have con-
strued the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crane that the State must prove 
the defendant has serious difficulty controlling his behavior in order 
to justify civil commitment.  Part III provides recommendations for 
how courts can better apply the control test going forward to ensure 
that defendants facing civil commitment proceedings for sexually vio-
lent behavior are afforded due process. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVILLY COMMITTING  
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS 
A.  Kansas v. Hendricks:  Addressing Due Process  
Challenges to Civil Commitment  
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act permits the State to civil-
ly commit sexually violent predators.  The statute defines a sexually 
violent predator “as any person who has been convicted of or charged 
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage 
 
15 Morse, supra note 9, at 253. 
16 Crane, 534 U.S. at 411-12. 
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in repeat acts of sexual violence.”17  It defines “mental abnormality” as “a 
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional 
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent of-
fenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and 
safety of others.”18  In Kansas v. Hendricks, the State sought to civilly 
commit Leroy Hendricks, an inmate about to be released from prison 
after serving time for sexually molesting children.19  Hendricks chal-
lenged the Act on substantive due process grounds, among others.  The 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas’s civil commit-
ment of sexually violent predators, as well as Hendricks’s confinement.20 
The Hendricks Court explained that the liberty afforded to citizens 
by the Constitution is not absolute and that certain exceptions are 
necessary for the “common good.”21  The Court noted that, under cer-
tain conditions, it had upheld statutes providing for the civil confine-
ment of individuals who could not control their actions and who 
posed a threat to the community.22  Articulating the narrow standard 
under which a person may be committed, the Court explained that a 
mere finding of dangerousness is generally insufficient to warrant 
commitment.23  However, proof of a mental illness or abnormality that 
is linked to the finding of dangerousness “serve[s] to limit involuntary 
civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment 
rendering them dangerous beyond their control,” thereby fulfilling 
the narrow tailoring required by the Due Process Clause.24  The Court 
left individual states with the discretion to define what constitutes a 
mental illness or abnormality and explained that the legal significance 
of these terms need not directly equate with medical standards.25  In 
specifically upholding Hendricks’s civil commitment, the Court found 
that an “admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction 
of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishe[d] Hendricks from 
other dangerous persons who [were] perhaps more properly dealt with 
exclusively through criminal proceedings.”26  
 
17 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2008).   
18 Id. § 59-29a02(b).   
19 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).   
20 Id. at 368-69. 
21 Id. at 356-57 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)). 
22 Id. at 357. 
23 Id. at 358. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 359. 
26 Id. at 360. 
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B.  Kansas v. Crane:  Closing the Gap Left Open by Hendricks 
Hendricks’s reference to lack of control left uncertainty in the govern-
ing law—namely, whether a showing that a defendant completely lacked 
the ability to control himself was necessary to justify civil commitment.27  
Kansas v. Crane directly answered this question but left further ambiguity 
in its wake.  In Crane, the State sought civil commitment of Michael 
Crane, who had previously been convicted of aggravated sexual battery 
and lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing himself.28  Crane argued 
that the Constitution required the State to show that he could not con-
trol his dangerous behavior in order to commit him.29  The Supreme 
Court first stated that Hendricks did not establish a requirement of total 
lack of control, explaining that “Hendricks referred to the Kansas Act as 
requiring a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes 
it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous 
behavior.’”30  The Court then stated that the Constitution did not allow 
the State to commit a sex offender without any lack-of-control finding; 
the “distinction is necessary lest ‘civil commitment’ become a ‘mecha-
nism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly those 
of criminal law, not civil commitment.”31 
The Crane Court acknowledged that lack of control was a difficult 
concept to define and quantify.  Justice Breyer wrote:   
[W]e did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow or 
technical meaning.  And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is 
at issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with math-
ematical precision.  It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior.  And this, when viewed in light of such 
features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the se-
verity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the 
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical 
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.32 
 
27 See, e.g., People v. Kirk, No. A094086, 2001 WL 1659543, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 
28, 2001) (discussing different states’ pre-Crane interpretations of what Hendricks re-
quired, including whether the standard for commitment required “total lack of con-
trol” or merely “volitional control that [is] impaired at some level”). 
28 In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286-87 (Kan. 2000), vacated sub nom. Kansas v. Crane, 534 
U.S. 407 (2002).  
29 Id. at 288.   
30 Crane, 534 U.S. at 411 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). 
31 Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
32 Id. at 413. 
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The Court again acknowledged that states have “considerable leeway” 
in defining the mental abnormalities that might justify civil commit-
ment.33  It noted that pedophilia, the disorder from which Crane suf-
fered, “critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack of 
control” and that “it is often appropriate to say of such individuals, in 
ordinary English, that they are ‘unable to control their dangerous-
ness.’”34  The Court nonetheless vacated the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
decision35 and remanded the case for further proceedings.36 
C.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Crane 
Justice Scalia wrote an oft-referenced dissenting opinion in Crane, 
in which he claimed that the majority had misconstrued Hendricks by 
requiring a separate finding pertaining to an individual’s lack of con-
trol.  Rather, Justice Scalia argued, “[w]hat the [Hendricks] opinion was 
obviously saying was that the SVPA’s [Sexually Violent Predator Act] 
required finding of a causal connection between the likelihood of repeat 
acts of sexual violence and the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or 
‘personality disorder’ necessarily establishes ‘difficulty if not impossibility’ 
in controlling behavior.”37  Justice Scalia would have held that a finding 
of lack of control inhered in the finding of a mental abnormality that 
caused future dangerousness.38  Justice Scalia also bemoaned the 
Court’s failure to define lack of control as a legal criterion and lament-
ed that the majority opinion “gives trial courts, in future cases under 
the many commitment statutes similar to Kansas’s SVPA, not a clue as to 
how they are supposed to charge the jury!”39  
D.  Control and the Insanity Defense  
The debate about whether lack of control can be demonstrated in a 
legal or clinical context originated outside of the civil commitment con-
text.  Most notably, the 1982 trial of John Hinckley Jr. brought the issue 
 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 414-15 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).    
35 The Kansas Supreme Court had held that the Constitution, as interpreted in 
Hendricks, required “a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behav-
ior,” and found that the trial court committing Hendricks had made no such finding.  
In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).   
36 Crane, 534 U.S. at 415. 
37 Id. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). 
38 Id. at 420. 
39 Id. at 423.   
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of volitional impairment to the attention of both the legal and medical 
communities.40  Hinckley, who attempted to assassinate President 
Ronald Reagan, was found not guilty by reason of insanity under a voli-
tional test that “exculpate[d] an offender who lack[ed] substantial ca-
pacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”41  The 
decision prompted the legal and medical communities to call for the 
elimination of this “irresistible impulse” test.42  The American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) released a report recommending that the insanity de-
fense only be available to a defendant who was “unable to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct,” since “[m]ost academic commen-
tary . . . continues to question the scientific basis for assessments of voli-
tional incapacity.”43  Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) noted that psychiatrists debated the meaning of volitional im-
pairment and that “[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an 
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight 
and dusk.”44  As a result of pressure from these organizations and the 
general public, several states and the federal government subsequently 
eliminated the volitional tests from their insanity defense statutes.45   
Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crane, the same concerns 
that led states to eliminate the volitional element of the insanity defense 
now plague civil commitment decisions.  As one commentator has 
opined, “The unintended irony is that volitional impairment lacks the 
 
40 See Bd. of Trs. Comm. on Medicolegal Problems, Am. Med. Ass’n, Insanity Defense 
in Criminal Trials and Limitation of Psychiatric Testimony:  Report of the Board of Trustees, 251 
JAMA 2967, 2970 (1984) [hereinafter Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials] (noting that 
Hinckley’s acquittal “served to focus national attention on the insanity defense” and led 
to “[w]idespread public outrage”); see also Jonathan B. Sallet, After Hinckley:  The Insanity 
Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548-52 (1985) (describing the trial of John 
Hinckley Jr., the reaction of the general public, and the shifting opinions of the psychi-
atric community).   
41 Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials, supra note 40, at 2970 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
42 See id. (discussing how the ABA adopted a policy eliminating the “volitional” test 
and replacing it with the question of “whether the defendant, as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect, was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the 
time of the offense charged”). 
43 Report of the Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice and 
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 715, 715-16 (1986); see also 
Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials, supra note 40, at 2970-71 (describing ABA and APA 
reform proposals).   
44 Insanity Defense Work Grp., American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity 
Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983). 
45 Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:  Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in 
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1214 (2000).   
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empirical basis for exculpation in federal insanity cases, but clearly is 
justified for the indefinite detention of sex offenders.”46  
II.  STATE APPLICATIONS OF CRANE ’S  
LACK-OF-CONTROL STANDARD 
While the Crane Court conclusively held that lack of control is es-
sential to the constitutionality of civilly committing sex offenders, it 
declined to articulate a way in which lower courts should actually apply 
this criterion.  After Hendricks and Crane, state courts were left to de-
fine the meaning of and evidentiary requirements for the lack-of-
control standard individually, although many of these states had reject-
ed the lack-of-control standard as unworkable for the insanity defense.47  
Consequently, states have developed numerous approaches, which can 
be broken down into three groups.48  First, three states have adopted 
an implicit lack-of-control approach:  courts in these jurisdictions do 
not actually instruct the jury on the issue of control, but rather sub-
scribe to the idea that proof of a mental abnormality predisposing one 
to engage in acts of sexual violence, combined with a showing of fu-
ture dangerousness, necessarily entails proof that the defendant serious-
ly lacks control over his behavior.49  Second, seven states have adopted 
a nested lack-of-control approach, in which the court reads the statu-
tory requirement of a mental abnormality or illness as requiring that 
the abnormality or illness cause the defendant to have serious difficulty 
controlling his behavior.50  Finally, eight states have adopted a re-
 
46 Richard Rogers, Imposing Order on Diverse Mental Health Laws, 48 CONTEMP. PSYCHOL.:  
APA REV. OF BOOKS 158, 159 (2003) (book review).  
47 Slobogin, supra note 45, at 1214. 
48 Other commentators have classified the states’ sexually violent predator statutes 
somewhat differently from the scheme presented in this Comment.  See generally State v. 
White, 891 So. 2d 502, 508-09 (Fla. 2004) (noticing that Arizona, California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin do not interpret 
Crane to require a separate finding on the issue of control, while Iowa, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, and New Jersey “have found that Crane imposes an affirmative, additional duty to 
determine lack of control”); Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct the Jury:  Crane’s “Serious Diffi-
culty” Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L. REV. 291, 300-01 (2004) (classifying Arizona, 
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and 
Wisconsin as states that do not require a separate finding of lack of control, but Iowa, 
Missouri, and New Jersey as states that do require such a finding); Peter C. Pfaffenroth, 
Note, The Need for Coherence:  States’ Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas 
v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2249-50 (2003) (same).  
49 See infra Section II.A. 
50 See infra Section II.B. 
Pierson FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 6:45 PM 
2012] Construing Crane 1537 
 
quirement that the government must prove, separate from the other 
elements required for civil commitment, that the defendant has seri-
ous difficulty controlling his behavior.51  
This Comment criticizes each of the three approaches to applying 
the control standard, concluding that (1) jurisdictions embracing the 
first approach are disregarding the Supreme Court’s holding in Crane 
and have essentially adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent as the law; (2) 
states that utilize the second approach, while faithful to Crane, make it 
too easy for juries to conflate a mental abnormality with difficulty con-
trolling oneself, even though these two concepts should be treated as 
analytically distinct; and (3) states adopting an approach that requires 
a separate finding of the defendant’s lack of control have failed to op-
erationalize this concept and rely too heavily on opinions from expert 
witnesses.  This last approach risks turning the separate finding on the 
issue of control into an empty legal conclusion that necessarily follows 
from the facts of any case.   
A.  The Implicit Lack-of-Control Theory 
1.  Declining to Require Specific Proof of Lack of Control 
Surprisingly, despite the Supreme Court’s clear language that 
“there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” to 
justify civil commitment,52 a number of states have failed to adopt a 
separate jury finding requirement on the issue of control.  These juris-
dictions interpret Crane to require some evidence of an offender’s lack 
of control but not a separate finding.  When the state proves that the sex 
offender has a mental abnormality and a likelihood of future danger-
ousness, these courts conclude that evidence of lack of control is nec-
essarily shown. 
 
51 See infra Section II.C.  Of the twenty states with civil commitment statutes, two 
were omitted from this analysis.  New Hampshire was omitted for lack of pertinent case 
law.  Pennsylvania was omitted because its civil commitment statute is limited to per-
sons aging out of the juvenile system, a factor which may change the relevant analysis 
and invoke ancillary issues not addressed in this Comment.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 6358 (2006) (calling for civil commitment hearings for minors who have been adju-
dicated delinquent for an act of sexual violence and who remain incarcerated in a ju-
venile detention center upon reaching twenty years of age).   
52 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
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The first case to adopt this implicit lack-of-control theory was In re 
Commitment of Laxton.53  John Lee Laxton was found to be a sexually 
violent predator under Wisconsin’s civil commitment statute after be-
ing convicted and serving a prison sentence for offenses including 
sexual assault, child abduction, and window peeping on young girls.54  
Laxton argued that his civil commitment determination was unconsti-
tutional because the jury was not instructed to determine whether he 
had a mental disorder involving serious difficulty controlling his behav-
ior.55  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a separate finding 
that Laxton’s mental disorder involved lack of control was not re-
quired, because it was already established by the nexus between his 
mental disorder and his dangerousness.56  The court explained that 
“evidence showing that the person’s mental disorder predisposes such 
individual to engage in acts of sexual violence, and evidence establish-
ing a substantial probability that such person will again commit such 
acts, necessarily and implicitly include[] proof that such person’s men-
tal disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling his . . . behavior.”57  
Once Wisconsin established that a state could validate its current 
commitment statute under Crane without adding an additional re-
quirement to the State’s burden of proof, other states quickly em-
braced the implicit lack-of-control theory.  In 2004, the Supreme Court 
of Florida held that Crane did not impose an additional element to jus-
tify civil commitment.58  Rather, under the Florida statute, the State has 
to prove only that a sex offender suffers from a mental abnormality that 
“predisposes him to commit sexually violent offenses” and that the per-
 
53 647 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 2002); see also Eric G. Barber, Note, State v. Laxton:  How the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Ignored the U.S. Supreme Court (And Why It May Have Gotten Away 
with It), 2003 WIS. L. REV. 977, 1002, 1006 (explaining that the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to hear Laxton’s appeal only seven days after the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its Crane opinion and noting that in Laxton, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
set a lower bar than the Supreme Court did in Crane). 
54 In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 787.   
55 Id. at 786.   
56 Id. at 786-87, 793. 
57 Id.  After the hearing committing Laxton, Wisconsin changed its jury instructions 
to include a reference to lack of control, providing that “‘[m]ental disorder’ means a 
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 
engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” 
Id. at 794 n.14.  However, the Laxton court noted that it rendered its decision using 
only the old instructions that contained no reference to control.  Id.  
58 State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 509 (Fla. 2004).   
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son is “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.”59  Like the Laxton 
court, the White court concluded that “[o]ne who fits such a description 
necessarily will have difficulty controlling his behavior.”60 
While the Texas Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the is-
sue, several appellate cases have adopted the implicit lack-of-control 
theory.  In In re Commitment of Taylor, Billy Robert Taylor, whose crimi-
nal history included several convictions for rape and burglary with at-
tempt to rape, appealed a trial court’s judgment that he was a sexually 
violent predator and was properly subject to involuntary civil commit-
ment.61  Texas’s civil commitment statute required the State to prove 
that Taylor had a mental abnormality “that, by affecting a person’s 
emotional or volitional capacity, predispose[d] him to commit a sex-
ually violent offense.”62  Taylor argued that the trial court erred in 
denying his proposed jury instructions, which would have required the 
jury to also find that Taylor had “serious difficulty controlling behav-
ior.”63  The appellate court rejected his argument,64 explaining that a 
jury’s finding that a person was predisposed “to threaten the health 
and safety of others with acts of sexual violence entails a determination 
that he has ‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior.’”65  
2.  The Implicit Lack-of-Control Approach Disregards Crane 
Jurisdictions adopting an implicit lack-of-control theory have disre-
garded the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crane.  In fact, many com-
mentators have noted that states embracing this theory have essentially 
adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent as the law.66  These states typically ar-
 
59 Id. at 509-10 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.912(4)–(5) (1999)). 
60 Id. at 510. 
61 No. 09-10-00231-CV, 2010 WL 4913948, at *1 (Tex. App. Dec. 2. 2010).   
62 Id. at *3 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.002(2) (West Supp. 
2009)). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at *4. 
65 In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 505 (Tex. App. 2003) (quoting 
In re Commitment of Browning, 113 S.W.3d 851, 863 (Tex. App. 2003)). 
66 Chief Justice Abrahamson’s dissent in In re Commitment of Laxton espouses this 
view:  “The majority opinion’s linkage or nexus analysis of the jury instructions adopts 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting view in Crane. . . . The court is obliged to follow the majority 
opinion in Crane, not the dissent.”  647 N.W.2d 784, 797-98 (Wis. 2002) (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 
(2002), and id. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Barber, supra note 53, at 991 (“In a final jab at the majority and the Kansas Su-
preme Court, Justice Scalia wrote:  ‘There is an obvious lesson here for state supreme 
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gue that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of state discretion to de-
fine legal terms like “mental abnormality” and “lack of control” pro-
vides them with the latitude to find lack of control implicit in the other 
elements required for commitment.67  These states also emphasize the 
fact that Crane did not overrule Hendricks, which did not require a sepa-
rate finding on the issue of Hendricks’s ability to control himself.68   
Neither of these arguments carries any weight.  Surely the Crane 
Court, in granting the states leeway to determine the precise meaning 
of lack of control, did not intend to provide states with the discretion 
to adopt a dissenting Justice’s opinion.  Reliance on the fact that the 
Crane Court did not overrule Hendricks is similarly misguided because in 
Hendricks, the issue of control was not in dispute—Hendricks admitted 
that he had serious difficulty controlling himself.69  By contrast, in Crane, 
in which the central issue was the defendant’s ability to control himself, 
the Court vacated the Kansas high court’s decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings in light of its ruling that the state must of-
fer some proof that the defendant is unable to control himself.70  The 
Crane Court thus responded to an issue that the Hendricks Court did not 
have the occasion to address.  As such, Crane did not overrule Hendricks 
 
courts that do not agree with our jurisprudence:  ignoring it is worth a try.’  His advice 
did not go unheeded.” (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Gaines, 
supra note 48, at 299-300 (“The trend of state appellate courts, with Justice Scalia’s 
blessing, has been to ignore Crane. . . . These state court decisions are contrary to the 
Court’s determination in Crane, which required specific proof of ‘serious difficulty con-
trolling behavior.’” (citations omitted)); Pfaffenroth, supra note 48, at 2250 (“[T]he 
courts appear to be following Justice Scalia’s dissent, not the majority holding, by find-
ing an implicit lack of volitional control in the determination that an offender suffers 
from a mental abnormality.”). 
67 See, e.g., In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 791 (describing how the Crane court eschewed 
the use of “precise bright-line rules” to safeguard constitutional rights in the area of 
mental illness and instead gave the states “considerable leeway” to define terms like 
“mental abnormality” in civil commitment statutes (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 413)). 
68 See State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 510 (Fla. 2004) (finding it significant that 
Crane upheld Hendricks even though Hendricks had not required the jury to find that the 
defendant had “‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior’” (citation omitted)). 
69 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997) (“Hendricks admitted that he 
had repeatedly abused children whenever he was not confined.  He explained that 
when he ‘get[s] stressed out,’ he ‘can’t control the urge’ to molest children. . . . He 
stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing children in the fu-
ture was ‘to die.’” (citations omitted)); see also Pfaffenroth, supra note 48, at 2250 (argu-
ing that there was proof of lack of control on the record in Hendricks but not in Crane). 
70 Crane, 534 U.S. at 415. 
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but rather expanded upon the decision by requiring proof of a sex of-
fender’s volitional impairment in order to comport with due process.71 
Most importantly, the implicit lack-of-control theory does not actu-
ally provide any proof of the defendant’s inability to control himself.  
The Laxton court explained that the “key to constitutionality” was the 
fact that a sex offender’s mental disorder must have “the specific effect 
of predisposing [him] to engage in acts of sexual violence.”72  Howev-
er, a “predisposition”—which under the Wisconsin statute can be a 
mental condition that is congenital or acquired,73 essentially including 
any causal agent whatsoever—has no bearing on whether that person 
can ultimately control himself.74  To understand this distinction, one 
could consider how a hypothetical man with perfect self-control would 
measure up under the implicit lack-of-control theory.  A person with 
perfect self-control may nevertheless be shown to have a mental disor-
der predisposing him to engage in acts of sexual violence.  As psycholo-
gists have explained, a person’s predispositions do not necessarily bear 
on his volitional capacity.75  Further, not all predispositions come to frui-
tion.76  The person with perfect self-control may also fulfill the Laxton 
 
71 “Because Crane did not overrule Hendricks, many states narrowly read Crane as 
implicitly approving the Hendricks position that requires no separate finding as to voli-
tional impairment.”  Gaines, supra note 48, at 315.  According to Gaines, these states 
ignore the fact that the Supreme Court vacated rather than reversed the Kansas Su-
preme Court’s judgment in Crane.  Such a move by the Court “clarified that Crane was 
not a blind reaffirmation of Hendricks, but instead a clarification that requires states to 
add additional due process protections beyond those that may be implicit in their statu-
tory definitions of mental abnormality.”  Id. 
72 In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 790 (quoting State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 124 
(Wis. 1995)). 
73 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (West Supp. 2008).  
74 The American Psychiatric Association has explained that psychiatry, as a deter-
ministic science, “views all human behavior as, to a large extent, ‘caused.’”  Insanity 
Defense Work Grp., supra note 44, at 685.  The suggestion is that mere causation, in 
reference to a mental abnormality or state, should not be probative on the issue of 
whether a defendant has or lacks control.  
75 See Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually 
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 450 (2008) (“Do 
not assume that diagnosis of a paraphilia implies volitional impairment.  One needs to 
provide positive evidence that the offender has difficulty controlling his sexually assaul-
tive behavior as a result of the paraphilia or of a comorbid condition.”); cf. State v. Ro-
sado, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369, 382-83 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (“The two concepts of predisposition and 
volition are separate and distinct, like ‘apples and oranges.’  A disorder, like pedophilia, 
might predispose someone to the commission of sex offenses, but the offender might 
have a great degree of control over the predisposition.” (citation omitted)). 
76 For a simple illustration, consider a person with a genetic “predisposition” to-
ward obesity, who nonetheless due to lifestyle choices never becomes obese. 
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court’s second criterion—that he has a high likelihood of again com-
mitting sexual offenses—because he chooses to do so, exercising his per-
fect self-control.  This exercise demonstrates that fulfilling the Laxton 
court’s burden of proof for commitment does not necessarily prove 
anything regarding a sex offender’s ability to control himself.  This 
standard contradicts the Supreme Court’s ruling that “there must be 
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”77  Thus, the states 
that disregard the holding of Crane remove a key constitutional safe-
guard from jury consideration.   
The dissenting opinion in Florida’s State v. White aptly criticized this 
approach, noting that “the entity charged with resolving the most im-
portant and core issue in the proceedings is not even told about the 
issue.”78  Empirical studies buttress the idea that decisionmakers do not 
consider the defendant’s actual lack of control under the implicit lack-
of-control formulation.  One Florida study found that psychologists’ 
and psychiatrists’ recommendations that civil commitment was appro-
priate under the Florida law could be predicted based on the following 
attributes of sex offenders:  diagnoses of pedophilia and paraphilia not 
otherwise specified, actuarial risk assessment instrument scores, psy-
chopathy, younger victim age, and nonminority race.79  While this 
study did not directly test for volitional impairment as a factor predict-
ing commitment, it is notable that the enumerated factors, none of 
which directly bears on an individual’s capacity for self-control, could 
predict decisions with ninety percent accuracy.80  Thus, in addition to 
the fact that the elements of these states’ civil commitment statutes do 
not necessitate a judgment regarding the defendant’s ability to control 
himself, this study suggests that considerations of control do not play a 
determinative role in practice.81  
 
77 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
78 891 So. 2d 502, 516 (Fla. 2004) (Anstead, J., dissenting).   
79 Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually Violent 
Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 
609, 625-26 (2006).  
80 Id. at 621.  For a discussion of which factors decisionmakers tend to consider 
when actually instructed to determine whether the defendant suffers from a volitional 
impairment, see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.  
81 The study also notes that “evaluator recommendations have been found to pre-
dict court outcomes.”  Levenson & Morin, supra note 79, at 613 (citing N. Zoe Hilton & 
Jaret L. Simmons, The Influence of Actuarial Risk Assessment in Clinical Judgments and Tri-
bunal Decisions About Mentally Disordered Offenders in Maximum Security, 25 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 393, 393-94 (2001)). 
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B.  The Nested Lack-of-Control Theory 
1.  Including Lack of Control in the Definition  
of “Mental Abnormality” 
A second group of states does not require a separate jury finding 
on the issue of lack of control but does require a tighter nexus be-
tween the sex offender’s mental abnormality and future dangerous-
ness.  Like the implicit lack-of-control states, these states’ sexually 
violent predator statutes explicitly permit commitment where an indi-
vidual has been previously convicted of a sexually violent offense and 
has a mental abnormality that makes him likely to engage in future 
sexually violent acts.82  But whereas jurisdictions adopting the implicit 
lack-of-control theory require only that the mental abnormality predis-
pose an offender to engage in sexually violent acts (and never explicitly 
mention control), jurisdictions adopting this nested lack-of-control 
approach explicitly require the mental abnormality to cause a lack of 
control by reading this requirement into the statutory definition of 
“mental abnormality.”  This interpretation of Crane—nesting the idea 
of loss of control in the definition of a mental disorder or abnormality 
and actually explaining this connection to the jury—has gained popu-
larity in several jurisdictions.   
In In re Leon G., the Arizona Supreme Court held that Crane did not 
require the State to change the language of its civil commitment statute 
to include a “serious difficulty in controlling behavior” requirement 
but emphasized that such statutes should meaningfully narrow the 
group of individuals eligible for commitment.83  With this view of 
Crane, the court found that Arizona’s civil commitment statute, which 
requires that the State prove that a sex offender “[h]as a mental disor-
der that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence,”84 
meets the constitutional requirement that such a statute be narrowly 
tailored.85  The court construed the word “makes” as meaning “im-
pair[ing] or tend[ing] to overpower the person’s ability to control his 
 
82 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 6600(3) (West Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5 (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
123A, § 1 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44 -48-30(1) (Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 71.09.020(1) (2011). 
83 59 P.3d 779, 786 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).   
84 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7)(b) (2001). 
85 In re Leon G., 59 F.3d at 787. 
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or her behavior”86 and found that “[a]lthough the statute does not 
mimic Crane’s ‘serious difficulty in controlling behavior’ language, the 
statute necessarily requires the state to prove that an alleged SVP’s 
dangerousness results from a mental impairment rather than from 
voluntary behavior.”87   
The Arizona court’s holding is a variation on that in Laxton, be-
cause the Arizona court emphasized the causal connection between 
the requisite mental disorder and future dangerousness, explaining 
that “serious difficulty in controlling” behavior requires proof that a 
mental disorder, as opposed to a voluntary decision, caused the person 
to act as he did.88  The Arizona court specifically rejected the Laxton 
court’s jury instructions because they did not clearly explain this causal 
connection and instead adopted the following instruction:  “[a]n indi-
vidual’s dangerousness must be caused by a mental disorder which, in 
turn, causes the person to have serious difficulty in controlling his or 
her behavior.”89  Several other jurisdictions have adopted a similar ap-
proach with their civil commitment statutes.90   
 
86 Id. (quoting In re Detention of Wilber W., 53 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Ariz Ct. App. 
2002), vacated, 62 P.3d 126 (Ariz. 2003)). 
87 Id. at 786. 
88 Id. at 787. 
89 Id. at 788. 
90 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons 
Act (SDPA) was constitutional under Crane because the court “construe[s] the term 
‘mental disorder,’ as used in the SDPA, to mean a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in the 
commission of sex offenses and results in serious difficulty controlling sexual behavior.”  
People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 749 (Ill. 2003).  Similarly, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held that a statute fulfills due process if it requires the State to 
show that the offender’s behavior resulted from “a mental condition that causes serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior.”  In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (Mass. 2002).  
The California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of jury instructions that 
require the state to prove that a sex offender “has a mental disorder which seriously 
impairs volitional control of violent sexual impulses.”  People v. Superior Court 
(Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 974 n.15 (Cal. 2002).  In New York, the court of appeals found 
that offenders are eligible for civil commitment where they have a mental abnormality 
that causes “serious difficulty in controlling” their sexually violent urges.  State v. Ra-
shid, 942 N.E.2d 225, 238 (N.Y. 2010).  Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
held that “Crane does not mandate a court must separately and specially make a lack of 
control determination,” but it does “require[] a court to determine an individual suf-
fers from a mental illness which makes it seriously difficult, though not impossible, for 
that person to control his dangerous propensities.”  In re Treatment & Care of Lucka-
baugh, 568 S.E.2d 338, 348 (S.C. 2002).  And in Washington, the state’s supreme court 
explained that Crane did not mandate a separate jury finding on the issue of the de-
fendant’s control, but it did require that the defendant’s mental disorder be linked “to 
Pierson FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 6:45 PM 
2012] Construing Crane 1545 
 
2.  The Nested Lack-of-Control Approach Conflates Mental 
Abnormality with Lack of Control 
Insofar as courts construe Crane as requiring proof of serious difficul-
ty controlling behavior but not mandating a separate finding on the is-
sue, these jurisdictions appear to follow the letter of the law.  However, 
the cases are problematic for a different reason.  By collapsing the re-
quirements of a mental disorder and lack of control into one finding 
instead of two, these cases weaken Crane’s constitutional safeguard.  
Specifically, this approach could lead the factfinder to improperly con-
flate the two discrete concepts and find that because a mental abnor-
mality “causes” an individual to act in a certain way, the individual 
must also lack substantial control over himself.  Professor Morse has 
explained that 
identifying a cause for behavior, including an abnormal cause, does not 
mean that the agent cannot control the behavior.  Causation is not per se 
an excusing condition; causation is not the opposite of control; the causal 
link between abnormality and conduct is not mechanistically inexorable; 
and it is simply not the case that all conduct causally influenced by mental abnor-
mality also indicates a sufficient defect in rationality to warrant the conclusion that 
the agent was not responsible.  The causal link simply describes the causation 
of action.  Although all actions are caused, not all actions are generated by 
lack of control capacity or by substantial rationality defects.91 
This position finds support in the psychiatric community, which has crit-
icized expert witnesses for assuming that a diagnosis of a mental disor-
der, such as a paraphilia,92  automatically equates to a lack of control.93  
In fact, only a subset of those sex offenders that have a diagnosable par-
aphilia will also have difficulty controlling their deviant behavior.94   
By requiring that a defendant have a mental disorder that causes 
volitional impairment, these statutes suggest that mental disorders and 
 
a serious lack of control.”  In re Detention of Audett, 147 P.3d 982, 989 (Wash. 2006) 
(quoting In re Detention of Thorell, 72 P.3d 708, 728 (Wash. 2003)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).   
91 Stephen J. Morse, Essay, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1025, 1043 (2002) (emphasis added). 
92 Paraphilia is a psychiatric term used to describe a deviant pattern of sexual 
arousal.  See See First & Halon, supra note 75, at 450 (describing the DSM-IV-TR defini-
tion of paraphilia and distinguishing volitional impairment from this definition). 
93 See id. at 444 (suggesting that experts should not take it upon themselves to de-
termine whether a defendant has a mental abnormality but rather should assist the 
factfinder in making this determination). 
94 Id. at 453.  It also should be noted that not all sex offenders have a diagnosable 
paraphilia.  Id. 
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volitional impairment go hand-in-hand.  This suggestion opens the 
door for the factfinder to conflate the two concepts rather than 
properly keeping the concepts analytically distinct.95  Several state 
court commitment proceedings have demonstrated this error.  Expert 
witnesses frequently (and often successfully) argue for commitment by 
relying on diagnoses that are widely criticized in the psychiatric com-
munity as not probative of the defendant’s volitional capacity, without 
offering further evidence of the defendant’s lack of control.96  Even the 
Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that a mental disorder implies a 
lack of control.97  Observers may reasonably argue that presence of a 
mental abnormality provides a good indicator of whether the defend-
ant lacks control, but this rule is too broad to ensure due process of 
law.  As demonstrated, the rule potentially captures a multitude of per-
sons with no volitional impairment.  Further, allowing the burden to 
be met with evidence that has no particular bearing on the issue would 
render the lack-of-control requirement empty.   
 
95 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 74 P.3d 779, 782 (Cal. 2003) (describing an expert 
witness’s testimony that the “defendant does not ‘have very good control over his im-
pulses or his emotions in general because he suffers from a mental illness’”). 
96 Compare State v. Stout (In re Detention of Stout), 114 P.3d 658, 664 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2005) (finding that evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State justi-
fied commitment, where a psychiatrist testified that defendant’s antisocial personality 
disorder [APD] and paraphilia caused him to have “difficulty in controlling his urges”), 
and Roush v. State, No. 29679-9-II, 2004 WL 1157833, at *1, *7-9 (Wash. Ct. App. May 
25, 2004) (finding that a diagnosis of “paraphilia not otherwise specified” involving 
nonconsenting persons, a history of reoffending, and statements by the defendant in-
dicating a desire to “break the cycle” were sufficient to support commitment), with 
John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and Then Commit Him for Life:  Sex Offender 
Risk Assessment (pt. 2), CHAMPION, Mar. 2009, at 32, 34-35 (noting that “offenders with 
APD . . . have control over most, if not all, of their behaviors and are unwilling to re-
strain their impulses” and that there is a debate “as to whether the diagnosis Paraphilia 
Not Otherwise Specified-Nonconsent (rape subtype) even exists” because of the lack of 
research establishing its validity and the fact that rapes are often driven by the desire to 
exercise power and control rather than out of sexual interest).  
97 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002) (describing pedophilia as “a mental 
abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack of con-
trol”).  But see First & Halon, supra note 75, at 450 (“It is important to understand that 
having a diagnosis of a paraphilia does not imply that the person also has difficulty 
controlling his behavior.”); Fabian, supra note 96, at 33 (arguing that a diagnosis of a 
mental abnormality is not enough to show that a person lacks control such that he may 
be committed). 
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C.  Control as a Separate Element for Commitment 
1.  Requiring a Separate Finding of a Sex  
Offender’s Lack of Control 
To justify civil commitment, a number of states require that the 
factfinder make a separate finding regarding the defendant’s lack of 
control.  Thus, courts in these states generally interpret Crane to re-
quire the State to prove both that the defendant has serious difficulty 
controlling his sexually violent behavior and that the state’s statutory 
elements for commitment are met.98  States requiring a separate find-
ing on the issue of control have not operationalized the Crane stand-
ard; rather, they have relied on case-specific factors and expert 
testimony to civilly commit sex offenders. 
a.  Remanding Cases Without Giving a Standard 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that “the State must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has serious 
difficulty controlling his or her harmful sexual behavior such that it is 
highly likely that the person will not control his or her sexually violent 
behavior and will reoffend.”99  The case, In re W.Z., concerned the civil 
commitment of a man with a history of sexual assault crimes who had 
been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and intermittent 
explosive disorder.100  The court remanded the case to the trial court 
to determine whether the defendant had serious difficulty controlling 
himself101 but gave no further guidance on how to determine the req-
uisite degree of volitional impairment.   
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the civil com-
mitment judgments against two defendants and remanded their cases 
because both trial courts had given jury instructions that did not re-
quire a finding of whether the defendant’s mental abnormality caused 
the defendant “serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.”102  The 
court noted that there was enough evidence to justify such a finding in 
 
98 Statutes in Nebraska and Virginia explicitly require a showing that the defendant 
has substantial difficulty controlling behavior, so courts do not have to read this re-
quirement into the statutory language.  See NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2008); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 37.2-900 (West Supp. 2010).  
99 In re W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 219 (N.J. 2002). 
100 Id. at 207-08. 
101 Id. at 219. 
102 Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 791-92 (Mo. 2002). 
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both cases but remand was nonetheless necessary because the instruc-
tions failed to state the requirements for commitment in this “essential 
way.”103  The court provided no further explanation of what constituted 
“serious difficulty” in controlling behavior.  
b.  Affirming Commitment with a Factor-Based Approach 
In Kansas, where Crane originated, the state has adopted pattern ju-
ry instructions that require the State to prove the defendant’s lack of 
control as a separate element for commitment.104  In In re Care & 
Treatment of Ward, the Court of Appeals of Kansas found sufficient evi-
dence to establish the defendant’s serious difficulty in controlling his 
behavior due to his pedophilia, which an expert testified made the 
defendant “likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence,” and his 
resistance toward “therapeutic efforts to help control his behavior.”105 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota requires the State to prove,  
“by expert evidence in the record,” that the defendant has difficulty 
controlling his behavior.”106  In In re Vantreece, the court upheld the 
civil commitment of a sexually violent predator based on the trial 
court’s specific findings that the defendant both demonstrated and 
admitted to having uncontrolled anger, masturbated compulsively 
while in jail, failed to cooperate in past treatments, lacked remorse, 
and stalked several women.107 
c.  Affirming Commitment By Relying on Expert Testimony 
Some courts rely heavily on testimony from expert witnesses in de-
termining whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling 
himself.  For instance, because Iowa treats the issue of whether a sex 
offender has serious difficulty controlling behavior as a separate ele-
ment that the State must prove to justify civil commitment, its courts 
often rely on expert testimony.108  In In re Detention of Barnes, the Su-
 
103 Id. at 792. 
104 See KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS—CRIMINAL 
57.40 (3d ed. 2006); see also State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 512 (Fla. 2004) (noting the 
post-Crane revision of Kansas’s pattern jury instructions). 
105 131 P.3d 540, 551 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).   
106 State v. Vantreece (In re Vantreece), 771 N.W.2d 585, 590 (N.D. 2009).   
107 Id. at 592.   
108 See State v. Barnes (In re Detention of Barnes), 658 N.W.2d 90, 100 (Iowa 2003) 
(“[D]ue process requires the State to show a person has ‘a serious difficulty in control-
ling behavior’ to support civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.”).   
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preme Court of Iowa affirmed the civil commitment of a sexually vio-
lent predator who had been diagnosed with antisocial personality dis-
order.109  The court found that the issue of the defendant’s control 
“essentially turned on a judgment of credibility between two experts 
with different opinions” regarding whether the defendant’s mental dis-
order caused volitional impairment.110  The court upheld the trial 
court’s decision to give greater weight to the testimony of a psychiatrist 
who stated that “antisocial individuals with sexually violent histories[] 
are the subset of antisocial personality disordered individuals that have 
specific difficulty in controlling their behavior.”111  This testimony con-
tradicted the testimony of a psychiatrist who explained that antisocial 
personality disorder did not affect the ability to control behavior and 
who argued that punishment of antisocial individuals should fall to the 
criminal system.112 
Similarly, in In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held that while “Crane adds to Hendricks the affirmative duty to 
make a lack of control determination,” it provided no clear standard 
for making that determination.113  The court concluded that the dis-
trict court had made specific findings on the interaction between 
Ramey’s “past violent sexual behavior and his present mental disorders 
or dysfunctions” that supported a lack-of-control determination.114  In 
affirming his commitment, the court also relied on an expert who tes-
tified that “Ramey lacked ‘utter control’ over his sexual impulses when 
drinking or using cocaine,” both of which he was likely to use upon his 
release from prison.115 
In order to justify commitment, Nebraska courts require the State 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is “sub-
stantially unable to control his criminal behavior,” meaning that the 
defendant “ha[s] serious difficulty in controlling or resisting the desire 
or urge to commit sex offenses.”116  In In re Interest of O.S., the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska upheld a determination that the defendant was a 
 
109 State v. Barnes (In re Detention of Barnes), 690 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Iowa 2004). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 648 N.W.2d 260, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
114 Id. at 268. 
115 Id.  
116 O.S. v. Mental Health Bd. (In re Interest of O.S.), 763 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Neb. 
2009) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Pierson FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)4/17/2012 6:45 PM 
1550 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1527 
 
“dangerous sex offender” on the basis of expert testimony that the de-
fendant had been diagnosed “with psychopathy personality disorder, 
exhibitionism, and paraphilia, . . . [and] lack[ed] the capacity or con-
trol, because of mental illness or other factors, to refrain from engag-
ing in a sexually inappropriate act.”117 
Virginia’s civil commitment statute explicitly requires the State to 
prove that “because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder, 
[the defendant] finds it difficult to control his predatory behavior” in 
order for the defendant to be deemed a “sexually violent predator” 
subject to commitment.118  The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a 
sexually violent predator’s commitment based on the opinion of a 
clinical psychologist, who testified that the defendant “met the criteria 
for a sexually violent predator” under Virginia law.119  Specifically, the 
psychologist stated that the defendant suffered from pedophilia as well 
as a personality disorder that “cause[d] him to violate society’s rules 
and customs” and made it difficult for him to “control his predatory 
behavior.”120 
2.  Overreliance on Expert Testimony and  
the Need for a Clear Standard 
Jurisdictions that require the State to prove that the defendant has 
serious difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior clearly follow 
Crane ’s mandate that there must be proof of lack of control “to distin-
guish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, ab-
normality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the 
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal 
case.”121  However, none of the states that have adopted this approach 
has attempted to operationalize the control standard or explain exact-
ly what the State must show to civilly commit a sex offender.  The su-
preme courts of both New Jersey and Missouri remanded cases 
 
117 Id. at 730.   
118 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (West Supp. 2010). 
119 Boyce v. Commonwealth, 691 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Va. 2010). 
120 Id. 
121 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).  Some commentators argue that the 
only correct interpretation of Crane is that the Supreme Court was mandating a separate 
jury finding regarding defendants’ lack of control in order to justify civil commitment.  
See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 48, at 316 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s granting 
certiorari, vacating, and remanding certain cases for reconsideration in light of Crane 
demonstrates the Court’s requirement of a separate jury finding on lack of control). 
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because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the issue of lack of 
control.122  However, these states did not use the opportunity to articu-
late a clear definition of what constitutes lack of control and instead 
simply reiterated the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crane.123    
At least one empirical study has examined what decisionmakers ac-
tually consider in determining whether a defendant lacks substantial 
ability to control himself in the context of both civil commitment pro-
ceedings and insanity hearings.124  Noting courts’ failure to clarify the 
standard, the researchers found that legal professionals, psychologists, 
and mock jurors consider the defendant’s verbalization of control 
(such as an admitted lack of control), the defendant’s history of sexual 
offenses, and the context of the proceeding to be the criteria most rel-
evant to a finding of volitional impairment.125  Moreover, decisionmak-
ers were more likely to find volitional impairment in the context of a 
civil commitment proceeding than in an insanity hearing.126  As the 
researchers noted, “[i]f the[se] are not the types of variables that 
should ‘matter,’ then this suggests that the courts and legislatures need 
to be more explicit in articulating” a standard for volitional impair-
ment.127  To give courts more explicit guidance, the research concluded, 
legislatures and courts should explain how “these identified factors and 
others support or fail to support a finding of volitional impairment.”128   
The fact that decisionmakers were more likely to find lack of con-
trol in the context of a commitment proceeding than in an insanity 
hearing is especially distressing from the standpoint of assuring due 
process because the context of the proceeding should have no bearing 
on the determination of a defendant’s inherent biological or character 
trait.129  This research suggests that bias against sex offenders may 
 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.   
123 See supra notes 93-97 & accompanying text.   
124 See Cynthia Calkins Mercado et al., Decision-Making About Volitional Impairment in 
Sexually Violent Predators, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 589-90 (2006) (noting courts’ lack 
of clarity and setting forth the study’s purpose in evaluating conceptions of volitional 
impairment among different groups). 
125 See id. at 597.  
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 600. 
128 Id. 
129 While there is nothing necessarily wrong with adopting different standards for 
measuring control in different contexts, this study is noteworthy because the subjects 
were not instructed to apply a different standard based on the context of the proceed-
ing.  See id. at 592.  Thus, the fact that participants’ judgments regarding lack of control 
depended on the context of the proceeding suggests that “participants may have been 
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cause the concept of volitional impairment to be used as a sword to 
civilly commit defendants130 more frequently than it is used as a shield 
to exculpate defendants of criminal responsibility in the context of an 
insanity hearing.131   
In addition to failing to operationalize the control standard, states 
frequently err by identifying factors ex post that prove a defendant 
lacks substantial ability to control himself.  The supreme courts of 
Kansas and North Dakota relied on a variety of factors, such as refusal 
of treatment, paraphilia diagnoses, admissions by the defendant, and 
patterns of past criminal sexual activity to uphold the civil commit-
ment determinations in Ward and Vantreece.132  The problem with this 
approach is that the courts did not identify ex ante the factors that 
would be considered in making these determinations, nor did they 
state that these factors should be determinative in cases going forward.  
In essence, they declined to promulgate a rule for the future, and the 
factors they identified served only to affirm the lower courts’ determi-
nations.  This approach makes it all too easy for a court to selectively 
identify the factors that it wants to consider in a particular case based 
on the outcome it hopes to reach.  The unsympathetic nature of sex 
offender defendants suggests that courts will identify factors that weigh 
in favor of commitment.  
Lastly, many cases err by relying almost exclusively on expert testi-
mony in affirming commitment decisions, even though there is no 
consensus among medical professionals on how to measure self-
control.133  Experts frequently reference only the defendant’s clinical 
diagnosis and past criminal conduct when providing an opinion on 
whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling himself.134  
However, drawing a conclusion that the defendant has a volitional im-
 
more apt to endorse a vacuous notion [of lack of control] when it supported continued 
confinement over release . . . or incarceration over hospitalization.”  Id. at 598.  
130 That is, when the factfinder determines that a defendant has serious difficulty 
controlling his behavior and should therefore be detained indefinitely, even though he 
has already endured criminal sanctions. 
131 That is, when a factfinder determines that because a defendant is substantially un-
able to control himself, he should not be culpable and subject to criminal punishment. 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 105-07. 
133 See Holly A. Miller et al., Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations:  Empirical Evidence, 
Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 46 (2005) 
(“In addition to the lack of agreed upon methodology to assess ‘inability to control,’ at 
present there is no consistently utilized definition of just what is being assessed.”). 
134 See, supra note 95 and accompanying text (recounting an expert’s testimony that 
the defendant lacked control because he suffered from a mental illness).  
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pairment from only a diagnosis and past offenses “is at best post hoc ergo 
propter hoc reasoning, and at worst a complete tautology,”135 since the rel-
evant diagnoses, like paraphilia or personality disorder, are constructs 
drawn from evidence of past and current behavior and lack an identifi-
able underlying pathology that can be said to cause the behavior.136   
In addition to the fact that the mental health community has not 
developed a consistent way to measure volitional impairment or identi-
fied its pathology, the usefulness of expert testimony is also tempered 
because ultimately the question of the defendant’s capacity for self-
control is a legal, rather than a medical, issue.  Thus, a medical profes-
sional’s conclusions regarding a defendant’s volitional impairment 
may not have any correlation to the relevant legal standard.  But be-
cause courts do not define the legal standard, they leave the door 
open for medical judgment to substitute for legal judgment.  The con-
flation of these two standards is contrary to the Court’s admonition in 
Crane that the “science of psychiatry [should] inform[] but . . . not 
control ultimate legal determinations” because its “distinctions do not 
seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”137 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO COURTS APPLYING CRANE 
States should construe Crane to require a separate finding on the is-
sue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling himself.  
States adopting an implicit lack-of-control theory—in which lack of 
control is necessarily proven by demonstrating that the defendant has 
a mental abnormality that predisposes him to commit sexually violent 
acts—have clearly disregarded the Court’s holding in Crane and incor-
rectly adopted Justice Scalia’s dissent as the law.  Other jurisdictions that 
adopt a slightly different interpretation of Crane—maintaining that the 
defendant must have a mental abnormality that causes serious difficulty 
controlling behavior—do not violate Crane insofar as the decision re-
quires only that the State put forward some proof of lack of control in 
order to commit the defendant.  However, this construction of the stat-
 
135 Stephen D. Hart & P. Randall Kropp, Sexual Deviance and the Law, in SEXUAL DE-
VIANCE:  THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 557, 564 (D. Richard Laws & William T. 
O’Donohue eds., 2008). 
136 Miller et al., supra note 133, at 41, 46-47 (discussing the classification of para-
philia and personality disorder and noting that they are classifications based on symp-
toms and behaviors alone). 
137 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).  
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ute makes it too easy for the factfinder to conflate a defendant’s mental 
abnormality with volitional impairment.   
The requirement of a separate finding is the best understanding of 
the proof mandated by Crane.  However, states that have embraced this 
interpretation have failed to operationalize Crane’s control test—
leading to inconsistent and ad hoc decisions—and instead have relied 
heavily on the opinions of experts who lack scientific backing for their 
determinations.  
A.  Operationalizing the Control Standard 
States should attempt to operationalize the rule that the defendant 
must have serious difficulty controlling himself in order to justify civil 
commitment.  If we conceive of self-control as a spectrum and Crane’s 
ruling as a vaguely directed mandate for high-stakes line drawing along 
this spectrum, then states should more clearly elucidate the point 
where decisionmakers should aim to draw the line.  This guidance 
could come in the form of a standardized list of factors that bear on the 
issue of control138 or a definition of control that appeals to community 
judgments, similar to the “reasonable person” standard.  One potential 
implementation of the control standard would ask the jury to consider 
whether the offender would be likely to commit a sexually violent crime 
in nearly all situations where punishment is not clearly imminent, and 
whether the offender would want to exercise discipline over his de-
sires—although unable to do so—in these circumstances.139 
 
138 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text for factors currently used by 
some courts in making this determination. 
139 This effort has its origins in Professor Michael Corrado’s scholarship.  He has 
developed a definition for determining whether someone is “substantially unable to 
control his behavior and conform to the law.”  Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and 
Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 88 (2005).  That definition would require the following: 
1.  He committed the crime; 
2.  He did not suffer from a defect of rationality at the time; and  
. . . 
3(a).  The desire that led him to perform the action that constituted the crime 
would have done so, at that time, in any but the most exceptional circumstances. 
Id. at 87-89.  Professor Corrado explains that the “most exceptional” circumstances 
should be determined by the community, in keeping with the criminal law’s tradition 
of deferring to community judgment.  Id. at 88.  He notes that this inquiry should not 
focus on whether there is any consequence that could make a person curb his offending 
behavior—since even the “severely addicted” are unlikely to offend when there is a 
“policeman at the elbow.”  Id.  Rather, the inquiry should focus on how severe a conse-
quence must be to induce a person to curb his offending behavior; in other words, “how 
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Both of these approaches have their drawbacks.  Factor-based tests 
do not provide strict guidance or standardization to the lower courts 
and can be easily manipulated to justify a particular outcome.  A defini-
tional approach, on the other hand, provides a clearer legal standard 
but risks being over- or underinclusive.  To be sure, state courts and 
legislatures would face a formidable challenge in drafting a legal defini-
tion of lack of control based on community norms.  Still, this approach 
seems to be the best way to assist the factfinder in conceptualizing the 
legal standard so that it may be applied more fairly, predictably, and 
consistently (rather than permitting decisions to be made ad hoc and 
rationalized ex post).   
Even an admittedly imperfect operationalization of lack of control 
would still be an improvement on the present state of the law, which 
leaves the factfinder utterly without guidance.  Operationalizing the 
definition would help guard against the fallacy of presuming lack of 
control based upon the existence of a mental abnormality and would 
prevent conclusory determinations that a defendant lacks control 
based only on his past illegal conduct and clinical diagnoses.  It would 
also render trial court decisions more easily reviewable by higher 
courts and would let defendants know how their dispositions and con-
duct will be judged upfront, thus presenting them with a better oppor-
tunity to rebut these characteristics in their defense. 
 
much of a risk compulsion leads to.”  Id.  This definition is likely overinclusive—
capturing offenders who may simply be particularly risk-seeking and who freely choose to 
commit the crime in all but the most exceptional circumstances while still exercising 
perfect self-control. 
To narrow this definition, one could permit the factfinder to consider whether the 
offender wanted to act on his desire, or whether the offender wanted to stifle or overcome 
the desire, but was unable to do so in the absence of exceptional circumstances (e.g., 
the policeman at the elbow).  An offender who wants to act on his desires in certain 
situations and accordingly does so is able to exercise self-control in those situations and 
is therefore not eligible for civil confinement (but should only be relegated to the crim-
inal justice system if and when he commits a crime).  An offender who does not want to 
commit the crime but cannot exercise discipline over his desires in all but exceptional 
circumstances is one who has substantial difficulty controlling himself and should be 
civilly confined to protect the public under the Crane rationale.  
States could also raise the bar on what constitutes substantial difficulty controlling 
oneself, requiring that the offender be unable to stop himself from offending even in 
the most exceptional circumstances.   
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B.  Monitoring the Use of Expert Testimony  
There are a number of ways that testimony from and reliance on 
expert witnesses could be improved.  First, the court should carefully 
instruct the jury as to the role of expert testimony in the lack-of-
control determination.  Second, the court should use its discretion 
under the Rules of Evidence to exclude expert testimony on the ulti-
mate issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty controlling 
behavior and restrict expert testimony to a qualitative description of 
the defendant’s volitional capabilities based on the expert’s observa-
tions and experience in the field.140  
A court should carefully instruct the jury as to how it should con-
sider expert testimony.  Specifically, the jury should be informed that 
(1) the issue of the defendant’s ability to control himself is a legal, not 
a scientific, issue to be considered independently by the jury acting as 
factfinder, although potentially informed by expert testimony;141 and 
(2) that there is presently no consensus among medical professionals 
on how to measure a person’s self-control.142  Expert witness testimony 
should be considered with this legal and scientific background in 
mind so that the expert’s apparent authority does not unduly per-
suade the jury. 
Experts should also refrain from giving their opinions on the ulti-
mate issue of whether the defendant has serious difficulty in control-
ling behavior, since this is a decision for the factfinder based on the 
totality of the evidence and is measured by a legal rather than a clini-
cal approach.143  Allowing the court to exclude expert testimony would 
be in keeping with the reasoning behind Federal Rule of Evidence 
704(b), which restricts expert witnesses from rendering ultimate con-
 
140 See infra notes 133-36 & accompanying text.  
141 See supra text accompanying note 137.  
142 See Miller et al., supra note 133, at 46. 
143 There are many examples of civil commitment cases in which judges have ad-
mitted ultimate opinions rendered by expert witnesses, and appellate courts have used 
these opinions to justify upholding trial courts’ commitments of defendants.  See, e.g., 
In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (consid-
ering statements from two examiners that the defendant “lack[ed] adequate ability to 
control his sexual impulses” in reviewing the determination of defendant’s volitional 
capacity); In re Preston, 629 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (summarizing a 
doctor’s testimony that the defendant “met all of the criteria for commitment” under 
two state statutes); Boyce v. Commonwealth, 691 S.E.2d 782, 785 (Va. 2010) (describing 
how a clinical psychologist had formed the opinion that the defendant “met the criteria 
for being a sexually violent predator” under the state statute and finding this opinion 
supported by the evidence). 
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clusions regarding the “mental state or condition” of a defendant in 
criminal cases.144  Alternatively, courts should consider using Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude expert testimony of ultimate conclu-
sions and technical diagnoses when the probative value of this infor-
mation is low and the potential of prejudicing the jury is substantial.145  
In most situations, the probative value of an expert’s opinion regard-
ing whether the defendant is substantially unable to control himself is 
low, because the witness—no matter how knowledgeable in psychia-
try—will not be an expert in applying the legal standard.  A conclusion 
from an authoritative figure on an issue that appears to be within his 
expertise has the potential to strongly influence the jury.  For similar 
reasons, some commentators have recommended that courts go even 
further by banning experts from discussing clinical diagnoses at all in 
their testimonies.146   
Expert testimony may still play a useful role in the hearing process 
by providing a qualitative description of the defendant’s particularized 
volitional impairment, based on the expert’s observation and study of 
the defendant.147  Experts should “attempt to directly evaluate the voli-
 
144 See FED. R. EVID. 704(b).  While expert witnesses are typically permitted to ren-
der opinions on ultimate issues, this exception was added by the Insanity Defense Re-
form Act of 1984 so that psychiatrists could not testify as to whether a defendant was 
insane.  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE 190-91 (7th ed. 2011).  The rationale behind this addition was to “eliminate the 
confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory 
conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.”  Id.  Further, 
quoting the American Psychiatric Association, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted 
that “[d]etermining whether a criminal defendant was legally insane is a matter for 
legal fact-finders, not for experts.”  Id.  These rationales are no less applicable when 
determining a defendant’s volitional impairment in a civil commitment proceeding.  In 
addition, as in the case of insanity, the defendant in this context faces the potential for 
indefinite commitment.  
145 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
146 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science:  An Analysis of Mental 
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 603-04 (1978) (arguing that experts “should 
not . . . be allowed to draw conclusions or to state their data in other than commonsense 
and observational terms”); cf. Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators 
and Legal Mental Illness for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 437, 446 (1995) (argu-
ing that expert testimony describing an individual’s psychological capacities is relevant 
to the court’s determination of legal mental illness but that testimony regarding an 
individual’s diagnosis is not relevant). 
147 For a useful and comprehensive list of factors that experts should consider in 
analyzing the offender’s volitional capacity, see Fabian, supra note 96, at 36.  He rec-
ommends that expert witnesses take the following considerations into account:   
 [Offender h]istorically and currently meets criteria for a paraphilia diag-
nosis and preferably multiple paraphilias; 
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tional impairment by scrutinizing . . . why [the defendant] decided to 
commit sexual violence at some times or against some people or for 
some reasons, but not at other times or against other people or for 
other reasons.”148  Specifically, the main function of expert testimony 
should be to describe clearly and nontechnically the defendant’s rele-
vant medical history, general demeanor, responses to studies and ques-
tioning, and other attributes that the expert believes bear on a person’s 
volitional capacity.  The expert should not render a conclusion about 
whether this information amounts to a legal lack of control.  Further-
more, the expert should be permitted to provide general information 
regarding research in the area of volitional impairment and context 
for the level of impairment that the expert observed in the defendant 
as compared to other persons whom the expert has studied. 
Restricting expert testimony to a qualitative description of the de-
fendant’s volitional capacity and a presentation of contextual evidence 
would not only prevent conclusory analyses from biasing the jury, but 
would also serve a useful evidentiary function.  Expert testimony pro-
vides the factfinder with a description of the defendant’s capacity for 
self-control from a knowledgeable and experienced third party.  This 
information helps the factfinder form a more complete picture of the 
defendant so that it can apply the legal standard regarding lack of con-
trol with consideration of the many facets of this complicated issue.  
Restricting expert testimony in this way allows the factfinder to gain 
additional insight to inform its ultimate determination of the main 
 
 [Offender has h]istory of frequent sex crimes in the community indicat-
ing sexual preoccupation and hypersexuality; 
 [Offender engages in f]requent acts of sexual violence within a closely 
proximate period of time when at risk in the community (while on su-
pervision or while participating in outpatient sex offender treatment 
programming); 
 Offender engages in behavior when he is aware of a high probability of 
getting apprehended; 
 Offender lacks insight and understanding into his offending behavior; 
 Offender lacks control of his behavior when it is unreasonable to expect 
him to engage or not engage in a certain act under his particular circum-
stances (considering context of offender’s offending patterns);   
 Offender sexually acts out to relieve overwhelming anxiety and distress; 
and 
 Offender’s strength of sexual desire interferes with his ability to consider 
alternative courses of action, and decision/ability not to reoffend. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
148 Hart & Kropp, supra note 135, at 564. 
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issue of the case—whether the defendant has serious difficulty control-
ling his behavior 
CONCLUSION 
States have already committed thousands of sex offenders to men-
tal health facilities.149  The Supreme Court’s recent ruling on the con-
stitutionality of a federal civil commitment statute for sex offenders150 
suggests that even more offenders will soon be committed indefinitely.  
In this high-stakes decision regarding the liberty of citizens, the Su-
preme Court has chosen to safeguard due process in commitment 
proceedings by requiring proof that the defendant has “serious diffi-
culty in controlling behavior.”151  The Court’s decision not to elaborate 
on this standard has given states wide discretion to determine what 
amount and kind of proof is sufficient to justify commitment and has 
resulted in numerous problems that sacrifice due process.  Indeed, it 
may be ideal to eliminate the control test in its entirety, as many states 
have done with the insanity defense, because of its unclear and amor-
phous meaning.  However, assuming that Crane’s constitutional hold-
ing will remain good law and that eliminating civil commitment 
statutes for sexually violent predators would be politically unpopular, it 
is important that we improve the current test to ensure that the pro-
tections of due process extend to this unpopular segment of society. 
 
149 See Deming, supra note 2, at 441 (reporting that, as of May 2006, 3646 people 
were being held as civilly committed sex offenders).  
150 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).  
151 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).  
